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INTRODUCTION
T
he Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) of the
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (“Kyoto Protocol”) is
intended to provide financial incentives that support the adoption
of technology in developing countries to reduce carbon dioxide
(“CO2”) and other greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions through
the creation of certified emissions reductions certificates
(“CERs”). A major aim of the CDM is to promote 
sustainable development, including sustainable energy tech-
nologies.1 Project developers may either sell CERs to a third
party in order to raise additional project revenues or use 
the CERs themselves to meet their own carbon emissions obli-
gations under domestic laws
implemented pursuant to the
Kyoto Protocol.2
Although the issuance and
sale of CERS potentially pro-
vide an additional source of rev-
enue for qualifying projects, the
CDM aspects of a project
involve their own subset of
risks. This article evaluates
CDM project risks, focusing on three risks that remain outside
the control of project developers and are critical for evaluating
CDM opportunities: (1) the estimation and delivery of CERs; 
(2) CERs price and volatility; and (3) uncertainty concerning the
future of the Kyoto Protocol arrangements and the CDM. It con-
cludes by assessing the potential for the CDM to address climate
change and the development of clean energy technologies to
mitigate climate change.
OVERVIEW OF THE CDM PROJECT CYCLE
The CDM project cycle is a multi-step process. First, proj-
ect parties prepare a proposal, which sets out the design of the
venture in a document called the Project Design Document
(“PDD”). The PDD is then evaluated by a Designated Opera-
tional Entity (“DOE”), a private third party certified by the CDM
Executive Board, which validates the project’s design and esti-
mates the expected contribution to emissions reductions.3 Dur-
ing this phase, the project parties procure an environmental
impact assessment, obtain the approval of the host government,
and circulate the PDD for public comment. The PDD is then
submitted to the CDM Executive Board who reviews it for com-
pliance with CDM requirements. Projects involving new
methodologies will also be required to obtain approval of the
specific methodology. If approved, the project is registered with
the CDM. Registered projects then implement a monitoring plan
approved by the CDM Executive Board.4
Pursuant to the monitoring plan, a DOE periodically verifies
the actual emissions reductions that have occurred during each
verification period. Based on the DOE’s written certification of
the emissions reductions, the CDM Executive Board instructs
the CDM Registry Administrator to issue the appropriate num-
ber of CERs to the project for each verification period.5
CDM PROJECT RISKS
In addition to the risks associated with project financings
generally, the CDM aspect of a project entails substantial risk for
project sponsors, investors, and project customers that rely on
the issuance of CERs either as a
source of project revenues or 
to meet regulatory obligations.
Issuance of CERs requires
approvals of the host govern-
ment and the CDM Executive
Board. Additionally, the actual
number of CERs that a CDM
project produces depends upon
the verified performance of the
project. Purchasers of CERs
should be concerned about the financial stability and perform-
ance of the project and their ability to take legal title to the
CERs.6 As a result, CER purchasers tend to favor project spon-
sors with established records, countries with legal systems that
will enforce project contracts, national regulatory authorities
that will provide the necessary project approvals promptly, and
reliable technologies. 
As with any risk in project financing, CDM risks should be
separately identified, allocated, and mitigated. This may be
accomplished through the use of insurance or other similar prod-
ucts or through the project documents.7
Below we analyze several critical CDM risks commonly
identified by CDM sponsors, advisors, and investors in inter-
views: validation/verification error, limited price visibility, and
regulatory uncertainty. These are not the only critical risks iden-
tified by CDM participants. For example, high transaction costs
and scalability of projects were also frequently cited risks. The
risks analyzed here should be considered in evaluating the future 
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TABLE 1: CDM PROJECT RISKS8
Risks Examples
Market and Supply Risks Immature market; affected by 
Assigned Amount Units prices, 
energy prices, and weather 
conditions.
Technology Risk Clean technologies still developing;
uncertain costs and benefits.
Certification/Verification Variation in validation and
Risk verification procedures.
Proving additionality requirement.
Difficulty in monitoring emissions 
reductions.
Failure to deliver promised CERs 
due to validation/verification 
estimate error.
Regulatory Risk CDM methodologies still 
developing and untested.
Kyoto Protocol only extends to 2012.
Potential for commodities or 
securities regulation.
Political Risk Host government must approve the 
project under domestic laws for 
sustainability.
Accounting/Disclosure No standard or oversight for
Risk reporting national emissions or 
CDM results. 
Conflicts of interest among project 
parties.
Credit Risk Counterparty credit risk (no 
exchange clears CERs).
Default Risk Failure to deliver CERs due to 
financial or technical failure.
Legal Risk No legal standards for CDM.
No case law in any country.
Complex national and international 
law issues.
Capital Markets/Finance Significant volume needed for 
Risk economies of scale.
of the CDM as they are inherent to the structure of the 
CDM arrangement and largely beyond the control of project
developers. 
Validation/Verification Estimation Error
In order for CERs to be issued, the emissions reductions are
first “validated.” Validation is an estimate made at the design
stage for purposes of approving the project methodology and
monitoring plan.9 Expectations are created from the emissions
reduction estimate, including the expectations of investors and
those who are considering purchasing the CDM CERs produced
by the project. After the project has begun operation, a DOE
periodically verifies the project’s actual emissions. The verifica-
tion determines the actual number of CERs to be issued for each
particular verification period.10
In order to assess risk associated with validation/verification
error, this author compared the validation estimates and verified
results of the 175 CDM projects that had issued CERs as of 
May 1, 2007. The comparison suggests that validation proce-
dures tend to overestimate the number of CERS that will ulti-
mately be issued by a project. Significantly, these results reflect a
broad range of CDM projects. 
For the first 175 CDM projects that issued CERs, the valida-
tion procedure overestimated the number of CERs produced by
approximately 27 percent on average. The standard deviation for
the population of 175 projects is 42.5 percent.11
The large error rate for estimating the issuance of CERs
increases the risks associated with sourcing CERs and investing
in CDM projects. For example, one major Canadian electric gen-
erator that has committed itself to meeting its requirements for
allowances through CDM and Joint Implementation (“JI”) proj-
ects expressed concern that the availability of CDM CERs will
be inadequate to meet its company’s needs. This company has
adopted a 25-year plan to achieve zero net emissions by 2024
and has gained considerable experience assessing approximately
a dozen CDM projects. However, due to financial and other risks
associated with CDM, the company has undertaken only one
CDM project. Given Canada’s role as an energy-exporter in such
carbon intensive areas as tar sands, the company expects that
CDM may not provide a realistic method for meeting its supply
requirements for emissions allowances.12
The estimation error in the CDM validation/verification
process has significant implications for CDM. As of May 1,
2007, there were over 1800 CDM projects that had estimated
their emissions reductions through the validation process and
will eventually verify their CERs. Because the validations 
have already occurred in over 1800 projects, they may show 
error rates of similar magnitude to the 175 projects that are ana-
lyzed here.
Potential Explanations for CDM
Validation/Verification Error
Interviews were conducted with CDM DOEs, sponsors, and
advisors in order to ascertain the reasons for the high error rate
in the CDM validation/verification process. Interviews were
conducted with three firms that are approved by the CDM Exec-
utive Board as DOEs. Collectively, these firms are involved in
the validation or verification of 83 percent of the approximately
740 CDM projects that were registered as of May 1, 2006, when
the interviews were conducted.13 In addition, interviews were
conducted with four firms that invest in and/or act as project
consultants to approximately 30 percent of all CDM projects
then listed with the CDM Executive Board. 
Surveys of these CDM participants revealed that a variety of
factors potentially contribute to CDM validation/verification
error. These firms identified the following as contributing 
factors: 
(1) Inadequate Technology or Measurement Methodology;
(2) Environmental Fluctuations;
(3) Supply and Demand Fluctuations;
(4) Delays in Project Completion or Operation; 
(5) Use of Conservative Assumptions in Verification 
Procedures; and
(6) Inadequate Guidance or Changes in Validation/
Verification Procedures.
The leading explanation of validation/verification error was
inadequate technology or methodology to measure emissions
reductions. For example, with respect to methane landfill proj-
ects, several respondents identified the primary cause of error to
be the lack of adequate technology to measure low concentra-
tions of gases over large areas. Survey respondents noted that
measurements are typically not conducted under ideal condi-
tions (as assumed in the standard methodologies), and very little
is known about the quality of waste in landfill sites, which
affects decomposition rates and the selection of appropriate
methods for analyzing data. Further, models and assumptions
used for estimation are often not reliable or appropriate for local
conditions.14
With respect to environmental conditions, the performance
of projects that depend upon wind, precipitation, river flow, or
heat (as in the case of decomposition of waste) will be affected
by fluctuations in weather conditions. These factors will signifi-
cantly influence the outcome of verification results.15
Supply and demand conditions also influence the verifica-
tion results of projects whose performance is linked to market
conditions. For example, electricity generation projects are veri-
fied based on the actual amount of electricity supplied to the
grid.16 Furthermore, delay of project completion or operation
can significantly affect the economic feasibility of a project and
its verification results.17 In particular, hydroelectric plants are
highly sensitive to construction delays.18
Several firms identified the use of inappropriate assump-
tions in the validation stage and conservative assumptions in the
verification stage as potential factors influencing validation/veri-
fication error. Several respondents noted that CDM methodolo-
gies often use generalized Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”) estimates that do not take local conditions into
account. For example, the use of IPCC estimates for methane
projects fails to take into account local agricultural conditions.19
Several individuals noted that because the validation stage
involves estimation, it is inherently subject to error, and one
respondent noted that project sponsors are often optimistic in the
validation stage.20 Others suggested that firms conducting the
verification may use conservative assumptions in accordance
with best practices recommended by the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization and other organizations, thereby further
increasing the difference between validation estimates and veri-
fication results.21
With respect to the adequacy of guidance or change in pro-
cedures, several respondents noted that the CDM Executive
Board has not provided adequate guidance for validation and
verification procedures. CDM methodologies have been fre-
quently revised, which has greatly contributed to uncertainty.
One respondent noted that some of these methodologies have
been revised several times already since their inception and that
CDM guidelines do not specify exactly what steps need to be
taken to validate or verify emissions.22 Another person indicated
that CDM rules which prohibit direct contact between project
sponsors and reviewing personnel have slowed approvals and
prevented project sponsors from receiving timely or detailed
guidance.23
Prospects for Improvement
Several respondents suggested specific aspects of the CDM
that can be improved to reduce validation/verification error. One
respondent suggested more detailed methodology regarding
monitoring requirements should improve data collection and the
consistency in assumptions used at the validation and verification
stages.24 Several individuals emphasized that proven technolo-
gies should exhibit less variability between validation estimates
and verification results.25 Finally, one respondent indicated that
training and assistance in locating qualified people to carry out
estimates for each methodology would help reduce error.26
Finally, CDM participants were asked their opinion as to
whether they expected estimates would improve in the future.
Respondents generally believed that results should improve,
while at the same time acknowledged that estimation error is
likely to continue due to the inherent nature of prediction. One
respondent stated that observers should continue to see estima-
tion error, especially for projects that are influenced heavily by
outside factors. In general, respondents believed that the vari-
ability is inherent in the design of the CDM validation and veri-
fication arrangement; validation estimates are made based on
theoretical engineering estimates, whereas the verification is
based on actual plant operations. 
EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES PRICE VOLATILITY AND
EXCESS SUPPLY
Interviews with industry participants revealed that CDM
CERs are priced based on multiple factors: spot and futures
prices of European Union Emission Allowances (“EUAs”), the
rules governing carbon offsets, risks of the particular project
producing the CERs, expectations regarding supply and demand
for CERs, and expected supply and demand for other carbon off-
sets, especially AAUs.
The starting point for pricing CERs is the spot and futures
prices of EUAs as this market is the most highly liquid and pro-
vides near-term price visibility. CDM CERs are priced based on
expected supply and demand for carbon offsets. CERs must
compete against supply from various other sources, including JI
Emission Reduction Units (“ERUs”), RMUs, and excess
Assigned Amount Units (“AAUs”). 
Over-allocation of emissions allowances presents one of the
greatest risks to the viability of the CDM. The availability of a
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FIGURE 1: EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS ALLOWANCE PRICES,
APRIL - MAY 200628
large number of low-cost allowances will lower the price of car-
bon and potentially increase price volatility of CO2 emissions
allowances. In turn, this will make more costly CDM projects
unattractive financially and will increase the risks of CDM proj-
ects in general. 
Over-allocation of emissions allowances has occurred in
both the European Union and Eastern Europe. The announce-
ment of the first verification of EU national emissions in May
2006 caused the EU Emissions Trading System (“EU ETS”)
market price of EUAs to drop by over 67 percent because veri-
fied emissions were 41 million metric tonnes of CO2, or approx-
imately 2.5 percent, lower than expected.27
The drop in EUA prices in May 2006 placed downward
pressure on CER prices and slowed CDM activity considerably.
As a result, many CDM projects are no longer financially com-
petitive.29
To place the EU over-allocation in perspective, CDM proj-
ects that had filed with the CDM Executive Board as of May 1,
2007 represented 305,801,000 metric tonnes of validated CO2
emissions reductions per year.30 The EU carbon over-allocation
displaces over one eighth of the total amount of these estimated
CDM emissions reductions. However, if the verification process
results in a lower issuance of CERs, as has been observed in
projects verified to date, the displacement could be considerably
higher. If the validation/verification error of the first 175 CDM
projects is representative of the other 1660 validated and unveri-
fied CDM projects filed as of May 1, 2007, the expected number
of CDM CERs to be issued would be approximately 223 million
metric tonnes of CO2 per year. The May 2006 over-allocation
would displace 18 percent of the expected CERs from the CDM
projects validated as of May 1, 2007.
Eastern European excess emissions allowances could have
an even greater effect on carbon prices. Most excess emissions
allowances are held by Russia and Ukraine. Russian and Ukrain-
ian excess emissions are expected to exceed 791.5 million met-
ric tonnes of CO2 per year by 2010 from fossil fuel emissions
alone. Table 2 sets forth the Energy Information Administra-
tion’s estimate of projected Russian and Ukrainian CO2 emis-
sions from fossil fuel consumption, and the resulting estimated
excess CO2 allowances.
If Russian and Ukrainian excess allowances enter the mar-
ket in 2008, they would exert significant downward pressure on
CERs and prices. To place this in perspective, if 791.5 million
tonnes of Russian and Ukrainian annual excess allowances pro-
duced from fossil fuel CO2 emissions enter the market, this addi-
tional supply would be approximately twenty times larger in
volume than the 41 million tonne over-allocation of CO2 in May
2006 that caused the price of EUAs to drop by over 67 percent.
The same 791.5 million metric tonnes CO2 per year would be
almost three times greater than the validated annual emissions
reductions of the 1835 CDM projects filed as of May 1, 2007,
and almost four times greater than the expected annual volume
TABLE 2: RUSSIA AND UKRAINE PROJECTED CO2 ALLOWANCES (METRIC TONNES)31
Year Russia Emissions Ukraine Emissions Total Emissions Projected Excess Allowances
1990 2,347,000,000 674,400,002 3,021,400,002
2002 1,522,000,000 426,024,926 1,948,024,926 1,073,375,075
2010 1,732,000,000 497,898,263 2,229,898,263 791,501,738
2015 1,857,000,000 539,804,109 2,396,804,109 624,595,893
2020 1,971,000,000 568,392,418 2,539,392,418 482,007,583
2025 2,063,000,000 599,999,369 2,662,999,369 358,400,632
Note: Ukraine is 17.76% of former Soviet Union projections. These projections only take account of excess allowances from carbon dioxide emissions from
fossil fuel consumption. Other greenhouse gas sources may increase the allowances.
of CERs to be issued by these CDM projects assuming that vali-
dations continue to overestimate actual issuances of CERs by a
27 percent error margin.
In addition, other GHGs are expected to produce additional
allowances for Eastern European countries in excess of 100 mil-
lion metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent per year, a majority of
which will belong to Russia and Ukraine.32 These excess emis-
sions allowances are approximately 33 percent of validated
CDM emissions reductions as of May 1, 2007, and almost one
half the number of CERs expected to be issued, assuming valida-
tion estimates continue to exhibit an error rate of 27 percent. To
the extent these other gases are permitted to enter the market, the
resulting excess AAUs from Eastern Europe will place addi-
tional downward pressure on the price of CDM CERs.
Rules Governing Emissions Allowances
The rules governing the CDM and other emissions
allowance instruments also affect the prices of CERs. Under the
Kyoto Protocol, CDM CERs and JI ERUs may be used in future
compliance periods up to a
maximum of 2.5 percent of a
party’s AAUs of emissions.33
However, Article 12(10) of the
Kyoto Protocol ensures that
CERs and ERUs obtained prior
to 2008 can be fully banked 
for use in the 2008-2012 com-
pliance period.34 In contrast,
AAUs are fully bankable with-
out limitation starting during 
the 2008-2012 compliance
period.35 Still, the EU has
allowed its member states to
decide whether unused EUAs acquired during the 2005-2007
trial phase can be carried over and used to meet emissions limits
in the first commitment period in 2008-2012.36 Potential tempo-
rary restrictions on the ability to bank EUAs for the 2008-2012
period enhance the value of CERs relative to EUAs during the
trial phase.
To the extent excess emissions allowances held by Eastern
European countries enter the market, these excess allowances
will affect prices and the operation of the EUA market, and in
turn, the CDM and JI programs. The Kyoto Protocol does not
place explicit limits on the entry of excess allowances; however,
parties are required to limit their use of tradable allowances to
levels that are “supplemental” to “significant” domestic meas-
ures to reduce GHG emissions.37 The EU has been particularly
active in seeking to promote domestic reductions through the
supplementarity provision. However, there are differences of
opinion among European officials whether a quantitative limit
on trading allowances is desirable.38 While it is not clear how the
supplementarity restriction will be implemented by Kyoto Par-
ties, it will influence how Eastern European excess allowances
compete with EUAs and other forms of AAUs, CERs, ERUs and
Removal Units.
The imposition of penalties by the EU provides some level
of price support for EUAs and CERs. The EU imposes penalties
for failure to deliver adequate EUAs of 40 euros per tonne of
CO2 in the trial phase which runs until December 21, 2007, and
100 euros per tonne in the first commitment period from January
1, 2008 through December 31, 2012.39
CDM CER prices are also influenced by the perceived qual-
ity of the project and project sponsors. As previously discussed,
there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the delivery of ver-
ified CERS, which increases supply risk for the purchaser of
CERs. One way to address this risk is to price CERs differently
based on the stage of the project; sales early in the process prior
to final approval receive a much lower price than those sold post-
verification. The creditworthiness of the seller also significantly
affects the price of CERs.40
Academic Study Projections of Future Prices
A number of studies have estimated future carbon prices,
with the results varying widely based on differing assumptions
and models. These assumptions
include different estimates of
future economic growth, oil
prices, cost of emissions abate-
ment, the rules concerning the
availability of Eastern European
excess emissions allowances, the
rules concerning trading across
emissions sectors and countries,
and banking of emissions. One
1999 study that compared the
results of eleven leading models
predicted prices would range
below twenty euros to 100 euros
per tonne of CO2 in order to achieve five percent emissions
reductions from 1990 levels. Seven of the eleven models sur-
veyed predicted the price would range from twenty euros to 35
euros per tonne of CO2 for a five percent reduction of 1990 lev-
els in a market in which the United States participated.41 More
recent studies have predicted median prices to range from under
one euro to under six euros per tonne of CO2 if trading across
sectors and countries is permitted under the EU ETS.42 The
study which predicted that CO2 prices should be under one euro
per tonne was based on analysis of the current EU ETS regime
and assumed that emitters will find relatively inexpensive meth-
ods to meet target reductions.43
These estimates are well below observed trading prices in
the 15-40 euros range. Again, the imposition of a 40 euros/tonne
penalty for failure to meet targets during the 2005-2007 period
may have supported the price at the observed levels. Alterna-
tively, these studies may underestimate the cost of reducing
emissions.44
LIMITED PRICE VISIBILITY
Interviews conducted by this author and industry reports
confirm that CDM projects have generally sold CERs for deliv-
ery though 2012, reflecting the duration of the regulatory regime
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rather than the potential duration of CERs contracts.45 Although
there is little activity beyond 2012, some survey respondents and
other commentators have confirmed that purchasers of CERs
have entered into options agreements for CERs to be produced
in the post-2012 period.46
The survey shows that because CDM projects require a min-
imum of approximately eighteen to 24 months to register and
verify CERs, most activity in the CDM market is for future deliv-
ery of CERs starting approximately two years ahead of time.
The EUA market provides limited, near-term price visibility
for emissions credits. Trading EUAs is primarily conducted
through brokered transactions over the Over the Counter
(“OTC”) market. In 2005, OTC trades accounted for an esti-
mated 80 percent of combined OTC and exchange trades.47 Lit-
tle data is publicly available for OTC trades.
Several organized exchanges also trade EUAs. The Euro-
pean Climate Exchange is the largest exchange, representing 63
percent of exchange-traded emissions contracts. This exchange
trades standardized futures contracts for delivery of EUA.48 As
of April 2006, 100 metric tonnes of carbon contracts were avail-
able for quarterly delivery through March 2008, and then annual
delivery from 2008 through 2012.49
An analysis of the European Climate Exchange’s Carbon
Financial Instruments (“ECX CFI”) futures contracts reveals
that liquidity in this market is mostly short-term. Open interest
in ECX CFI futures contracts is most liquid in the first year. At
the time of analysis, 79 percent of open interest in exchange-
traded EUAs was for delivery by December 2007, the time
period during which regulatory certainty is greatest. Survey
responses confirm the OTC EUA market follows the same short-
term pattern as the exchange-traded futures markets.
TABLE 3: OPEN INTEREST IN EUROPEAN CLIMATE EXCHANGE
CFI CONTRACTS, APRIL 200650
Open 
Period Interest
June, September, December 2006 46%
March, June, September, December 2007 32%





The statistics in Table 3 reflect the short-term nature com-
mon to most trading markets as well as the fact that supply and
demand in EUA markets is strongly influenced by regulatory
considerations. The significant volume of trades for the 2008 to
2012 period may be influenced by EU rules that impose a
penalty of 100 euros per tonne of CO2 equivalent for failure to
deliver adequate allowances in the first commitment period from
January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2012.51
The short-term nature of the EUA market provides limited
price visibility for longer-term CDM projects. This introduces
an added price risk for investors in CDM projects and purchasers
of CERs.
REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY
Regulatory uncertainty has adversely affected the CDM at
several levels. Because the Kyoto Protocol is only in force until
2012, there is uncertainty regarding the future of the CDM. The
short time horizon for the CDM through 2012 reduces incentives
to develop CDM projects.52 One project sponsor noted that if
there was greater commitment to the Kyoto Protocol by his own
government, he believes his firm would be much more aggres-
sive in developing CDM and JI projects.53
Uncertainty regarding CDM standards and methodologies
is another source of regulatory uncertainty. All firms surveyed
identified that uncertainty in standards and methodology were
causing significant delays and additional cost. For example, the
cost of a new methodology is typically recovered by its applica-
tion in multiple projects. Interviewees stated that the cost of
developing a methodology is approximately U.S. $150,000.54
Further, the time required to develop new methodologies is sub-
stantial. Methodologies have required an average of 280 days for
approval.55 Yet, a number of methodologies are under revision
and review, some of which have been revised multiple times.56
Several firms expressed concern that these problems could
undermine the viability of the CDM. 
Significantly, because CDM projects require a minimum of
approximately eighteen to 24 months to register and verify the
CERs, CDM regulatory requirements need to be clarified well in
advance of the upcoming compliance period to ensure a large
volume of CDM activity.57
Finally, the CDM will also be affected by the rules concern-
ing trading emissions between countries. In addition to the EU, a
number of countries are developing emissions trading regimes in
anticipation of the 2008-2012 compliance period.58 The regula-
tory arrangements for linking these national trading systems, the
rules concerning the supply of gases, and the excess AAUs that
will enter the market will affect the viability of CDM.59
PROSPECTS FOR CDM TO ADDRESS
CLIMATE CHANGE
The CDM is in the development stage and must overcome
several significant hurdles before it is a viable mechanism for
addressing climate change, promoting sustainable development,
and fostering clean energy technologies in developing countries
on a meaningful scale. Specifically, difficulty in reliably estimat-
ing and delivering CERs, oversupply of emissions allowances,
lack of clear CDM standards and methodologies, and regulatory
uncertainty concerning the future of the Kyoto Protocol are crit-
ical issues that must be addressed successfully in order for the
CDM to be a commercial and policy success. 
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